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Economic Developm ent and Financi al Institut ions
Gustav Ranis
Yale Univers ity

I.

Introduc tion

There has been relative ly little effort in the literatu re to systema tic
-ally deal with the role of financia l institut ions and policies in the context of developm ent. 1

Not unlike convent ional macro-ec onomics focussin g

on the mature industr ial world, such conside rations customa rily assume
their place in the sun mainly when we enter into discussi ons of the short
run but are relegate d to a separate and unequal status in conside rations
of the long run.

Admitte dly, business cycle problem s rear their ugly head

in both the rich and the poor countrie s; but their importan ce in the supply
constrai ned Say's Law environm ent of the develop ing world is surely much
smaller- -and thus the cost of the relative neglect of the financia l dimen

sion much larger.
We can perhaps achieve agreeme nt on this without too much difficu lty;
but where to start and how to insert the analytic al scalpel is quite
another matter.

This paper is not so presump tuous as to attempt a specific

answer; it is intended to do little more than suggest one possibly fruitfu l
avenue of approach .

The heart of that approach is a plea for more his

torical and typolog ical sensitiv ity.

1

There is, we believe , relative ly

For some of the few exceptio ns, see Raymond W. Goldsmi th, Financi al
Structur e and Developm ent (New Haven: Yale Univers ity Press, 1969); J. G.
Gurley, "Financ ial Structu res in Develop ing Econom ies," in David Krivine , ed.,
Rehovoth Conferen ce on Fiscal and Monetary Problem s in Develop ing States
(New York: Praeger , 1967); Ronald I. McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic
Developm ent (Washin gton: Brookin gs, 1973); H. T. Patrick , "Financ ial Develop 
ment and Economic Growth in Underde veloped Countri es," Economic Development
and Cultura l Change, January 1966; Edward s·. Shaw, Financi al Deepenin g in
Economi c Developm ent (New York: Oxford Univers ity Press, 1973).
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little mileage in analyzing the role of financial institutions in "the"
developing economy irrespective of time or place.

In fact, an awareness

of such typological and/or historical differences may be an essential
ingredient if we are to be in a position to treat the financial sector as
an integral part of the development problem rather than as an isolated,
if fascinating, afterthought.
We take as our starting point Kuznets' apt definition of the develop
ment problem as an attempt at transition from a long epoch of agrarianism
to a long epoch of modern growth.

Such a transition, if successful at all,

is likely to last 20 to 50 years or more and is itself, moreover, likely
to be composed of a number of distinct sub-phases during which the develop
mental characteristics of the society undergo substantial change.

Specific

ally, developing societies seem to first move out of dependent (or colonial)
agrarianism into independent (or post-colonial) primary import substitution;
from there into either secondary import substitution or export substitution;
and finally, if successful, into modern growth.

Each phase or sub-phase,

moreover, has differing requirements, if transition is to be achieved, with
reference to the nature of the appropriate financial institutions and policies.
This is the basic framework within which we will be operating.
hasten to reassure the reader on two counts.

We

One, we do not believe in any

"inevitable" historical stages of growth; however, if one does observe
marked changes in endowment, in the pattern of resource utilization, and
in policy over time indicating gradual changes of the rules of the game,
there is no reason to permit the ghost of Rostow to forever scare us off.
Secondly, we recognize.that "natura non facit saltum"--not even when countries
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would like to--and that the movement from one sub-phase of growth to
another must be viewed not as a quick orderly switch but rather as a
gradual and irregular transition over a period of years, with many charac
teristics remaining unchanged, with others changing randomly, and only the
behavioral center of gravity undergc,ing predictable variation.
In Section II we briefly describe the main outlines of the typical
LDC transition process in the ideal sense and then attempt to relate it
to the idealized changing role of financial institutions and policies.
Historical Japanese and contemporary Taiwanese experience will be viewed
as a proto-type.

Section III is devoted to an analysis and explanation

of the preponderance of real world deviations from this ideal pattern-
on both the real and financial fronts.
experience will be cited.

Philippine and Brazilian

Section IV, finally, is devoted to a summary

of findings and to the conclusions for policy emanating from the analysis.

II.

The "Deviant 11 LDC in Transition

The curtain of historical development may be arbitrarily raised on
the so-called colonial agrarian epoch when the overseas territories have
already been impacted by the investment, trade and (sometimes) political
and military presence of the (then already advanced) Western world.

The

essential, necessarily caricatured, characteristics of that period include
the existence of a raw materials or minerals intensive export-oriented
enclave, complete with ancillary services and (limited) auxiliary industrial
activities, side by side with a relatively large and relatively stagnant
food producing agricultural hinterland.

The proceeds of this natural

resources-based export activity are deployed in part to finance the luxury
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consumption needs of the domestic and foreign elite, in part to provide
industrial consumer goods to help pull workers out of subsistence agricul
ture and into enclave activities, and in part reinvested in the further
2
expansion of these activities- -or reinvested abroad.
The financial structure to accommodate the requirement s of such a
dependent economic system are as quickly summarized.

With respect to the

larger, relatively stagnant, agricultura l hinterland, any system approaching
the "circular flow" of the physiocrats makes minimum demands on financial
institution s and policies.

This is not to deny that the absolute volume of

traditional finance for traditional purposes may be substantial in toto.
To the extent domestic trade gradually expands, the demand for capital other
than of the traditional wages fund variety, of course, also expands, e.g.,
for roads, transport, marketing facilities, etc.

3

But while the money economy

is bound to be gradually displacing pure barter, to the extent little is
happening on the real side, little is required on the financial side, either
to lead or to accommodate .
Most of the dynamic activity--b oth real and financial-- is focussed in
the export enclave and those services and industrial activities which facili
tate :!.+.: .. functioning and expansion.

An important component of that accommodati ng

&ervice sector activity is, in fact, the banking function, sometimes tied up

2
Whether or not net foreign investment takes place, or capital is re
patriat"d, depends mainly--asi de from political considerati ons--on the foreign
demand 1,rospects for the enclave product, relative to other opportuniti es
facing the foreign investor. Moreover, as McKinnon has pointed out, "insofar
as indigenous individuals in the colony participate d in the process of bank
interme('iat ion, they were depositors rather than borrowers" (McKinnon, oz. cit.).
3
See Fei and Ranis, "Economic Development in Historical Perspective ,"
American Economic Review, May 1969.
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with management and enclave operations in the form of the East India
Company proto-type- -as a forerunner of the modern multination al corporation -
more often an expatriate specialized bank at the service of the exporting
4
and investing elite, foreign and domestic.
For our purposes the colonial agrarian epoch is of interest mainly
by way of contrast with what follows.

Once political independenc e is

achieved--a fter World War II in most developing countries, earlier in
Latin America--go vernments almost invariably attempt to restructure co1onial
production and trade patterns to facilitate national development .

This

effort most often takes the, by now well-known, form of a primary import
substitutio n sub-phase.

The overriding objective becomes the creation

and/or expansion of the industrial sector, especially in previously
imported consumer goods, and of the services and overheads required to
facilitate that exp~sion.

The main tool is government 's acquisition of

control over the traditional export earnings and their reallocatio n to
industry and overheads via exchange controls and licensing.
bare essentials of import substitutio n.

These are the

Usually they are accompanied by

substantial protection of the fledgling industries, either via tariffs,
more often via import quotas, accompanied by expansionar y fiscal and
monetary policies and associated with inflation and an increasingl y over
valued exchange rate--all intended to drive complementa ry domestic resources
into the same hands.

4

Foreign branch banks were integrated exclusively into the system
of the metropole (see E. Nevin, Capital Funds in Underdevelo ed Countries:
The Role of Financial Institution s, St. Martins Press, London, 1961.
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Much has been written in criticism of the import substitution policy
5
'
.
' d eve l oping
countries.
synd rome in

We do not wish to add to it here.

But, faithful to our historical perspective, we will simply assert that
such a sub-phase is likely to be an important ingredient for a successful
transition to economic maturity whenever entrepreneurial capacity is
initially weak and physical (especially rural) infrastructure deficient.
In other words, we believe that an infant industry/infant entrepreneurial
argument in general has merit and that much of the criticism of import
substitution along the Little-Scitovsky-Scott lines is really--and quite
.properly--directed towards the question of how much, what kind, and for
how long.

6

If that is the case, we can proceed to the question of the appropriate
role of financial institutions and policies in the context of the primary
import substitution sub-phase of transition.

The banking system clearly

represents an important additional instrument in the government's effort to
shift resources, domestic as well as foreign, into the hands of the nascent
industrial entrepreneurial class (or possibly into the government's own hands
overhead construction and/or in
wherever the public sector is involired i1)1directly productive activities).
It accomplishes this, in part, by holding government debt and assuming the
role of docile partner to government deficit financing efforts.

Floors

5
see, in particular, Little, Scitovsky, and Scott, Industry and Trade
in Some Developing Countries--A Comparative Study, Oxford University Press,
1970. Also, Benjamin Cohen and Gustav Ranis, "Import Liberalization and
Growth: The Second Post-War Restructuring," in Government and Economic
Development, G. Ran is ( ed. ) , Yale University Press, 1971.
6

For a fuller statement, see the author's "Relative Prices in Planning
for Economic Development, 11 in International Comparisons of Prices and Output ,
D. J. Daly, ed., NBER, 1972, as well as the exchange with Eckstein, Ruggles
and Stolper which follows.
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are often placed under banks' holdings of "safe" low interest government
.

bonds and ceilings on their holdings of other "unsafe" assets to accomplish
this purpose.

In this nominal sense financial institutions accommodate

the government's needs, usually in the absence of an adequate fiscal
capacity, to force some saving via the process of inflation and to simul
taneously shift the functional distribution of income in favor of profits.
Interest rate policy represents another important instrument in the
arsenal of import substitution.

By keeping official rates low (often nega

tive in real terms) governments claim to be encouraging overall investment
(which, given the customarily high marginal efficiency of capital, is doubt
ful) while channeling the limited credit available into the hands of the
new industrial elite.

The Central Bank similarly shifts the foreign ex

change proceeds, which must now be surrendered, to the same favored class
at artificially low (overvalued) rates of exchange.

There is an attempt

to bring in as much foreign capital as possible--init ially, aid and,
increasingly with time, private capital on very favorable terms.

7

The

financial system thus serves the import substitution regime's main purpose
of shifting resources and providing unearned profits to the new consumer
goods industries.
During this period there clearly exists a premium on "getting things
done," with relatively little concern with its level of efficiency or in
efficiency.

It is the brute act of saving and its redirection which is the

7Th .
.
. period
.
.
.
.
.
often far
this
during
capital
to private
given
e incentives
exceed what is required to attract it,and carry the seeds of later dis
satisfaction and conflict. For a fuller analysis, see the author's, "The
Multinational Corporation as an Instrument of Development," in The Multi'.'"
national Corporation and Development, Lewis Goodman and David Apter, eds. ,
forthcoming, 1976, Yale University Press.
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overriding objective, not the finer points of efficient allocation and
management.

Traditional raw material exports--supplemented by foreign

capital--continue to provide the main foreign exchange fuel for the primary
import substitution industrialization process.

Domestic saving emanates

from the direct reinvestment of industrial profits and from the surpluses
generated by agriculture.

Even the less extreme import substitution policy

packages, if not single-mindedly industry-oriented, tend to discriminate
against domestic food producing agriculture--e.g., via unfavorable terms
of trade, infrastructural neglect, overvalued exchange rates, etc.; con
sequently, the contribution of agricultural saving, the main source of
household saving, is likely to be limited.
More modest or flexible manifestations of primary import substitution,
such as experienced by Japan in the latter half of the nineteenth century,

8

or by Taiwan in the 19SO's, are, on the other hand, quite consistent with
substantial increases in agricultural productivity and the substantial
contribution of agricultural saving from the beginning.

Nineteenth century

Japanese agricultural surpluses, either captured by the government via the land
tax.or channeled through private hands, provided the lion's share of the
system's investment funds, especially in the early years.

9

But the heavy

Japanese attention to food producing agriculture, even during import

8
The "mildness" partially enforced by extraterritoriality which re
stricted Japan's ability to maintain high protective tariffs. And, perhaps
luckily for Japan, Schacht had not yet been born.
9

The land tax, for example, provided more than 70% of total government
revenue in the 1870's and 1880's and rent, mostly non-consumed, close to
60% of net agricultural output. (See G. Ranis, "Financing Japanese Economic
Development," Economic History Review, XI, No. 3, 1959.)
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substitut ion, transmitt ed also to her colonies, seems to be rather unique.
Private saving in agricultu re, if it does make a contribut ion, will,
of course, continue to do so mainly in the form of direct investmen t in
tangible assets such as the improve~e nt of land via levelling , draining,
etc., and the construct ion of other mini-infr astructur e.

As in the

Robinson Crusoe case, in the absence of much agricultu ral-non-a gricultur al
sector interacti on, the preponder ance of financial intermedi ation in this
sub-phase is likely to proceed via the individua l himself, or his family,
and substanti ally back into agricultu ral activity.

If food producing

agricultu re is relativel y dynamic, as in Japan, some of these savings will
flow into non-agric ultural rural activitie s, for example, into silk produc
tion, cotton weaving, etc., which constitut ed more than 30% of the income
of Japanese farmers by the end of the 19th century.

In either case, the

financial intermedi ation effort is focussed on the quantity of savings
investmen t, not on its quality.

After all, we do not know how good Crusoe

was at construct ing his first fishing rod.
As is well known, this primary import substitut ion sub-phase of transi
tion growth is bound to run out of steam sooner or later as LDC domestic
markets for consumer goods are gradually exhausted .

It is at this juncture

that the society typically faces the crucial decision of whether or not to
gradually shift to a non-trad itional industria l export orientati on, or to
persist with import substitut ion, this time of the secondary variety-
including capital goods, consumer durables and processin g industrie s.
If rec~nt LDC history is any guide, the majority of developin g
societies seem to prefer remaining on an import substitut ion course--i f at
all possible.

Especiall y if the natural resources base is sufficien tly

-10-

strong to continue to provide the fuel for this ever more capital and
technology intensive process, such a societal choice is very understandable
since it presents the path of least (especially political) resistance.
Strong vested interests such as the new urban industrial class benefitting
from the high temperatures of the import substitution "hot house," and
the civil service whose power (and sometimes income) derives in large part
from the typical control system are naturally loath to give it up.

As long

as the natural resources don't give out--either on the (domestic) supply
or (foreign) demand side--growth can thus be maintained--even though, at
least for the labor surplus economy, it becomes ever more inefficient.
However,

the costs of continuing this strategy

in terms of such other

increasingly important development objectives as the reduction of under
employment and income redistribution, may rise ove~ time.

10

In Section III, we intend to further analyze the situation in the
preponderant (non-deviant) majority of contemporary developing countries
which seem to have chosen secondary import substitution.

But first it is,

we believe, instructive to deal with the path a few deviant countries have
taken at the end of their primary import substitution sub-phase, namely
that of e,,port substitution, or a shift to non-traditional exports of the
labor-intensive industrial type.

Japan in an earlier day and Taiwan more

recently undoubtedly chose this path, mainly under the pressure of their

10

Much more could be said on this important subject but this essay
is not the place. See, however, Chenery, et. al., Redistribution with
Growth, Oxford, 1974•
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fundamental long-term natural resources scarcity.

It is this direction

which we consider "ideal" for at least the garden variety of labor surplus
developing countries--even those, like the Philippines, and much of Latin
America, with a substantially better natural resources base--and which
requires, in turn, "ideal" changes in their financial institutions and
financial policy framework.
The export substitution sub-phase is most easily--and briefly--descri bed
in relation to the presumed change in the economy's capacity to participate
in international trade on a more competitive basis.

If the major intended

purposesof import substitution have indeed been achieved, i.e., the matura
tion of a newly emerging industrial entrepreneuria l class and the construc
tion of missing infrastructure, e.g., in agriculture, in the field of financial
intermediation , and elsewhere, the economy should now be ready to increasingly
expose itself to competition in the international markets for industrial
consumer goods.
Such changes cannot realistically be effected overnight, nor are zig-zags
of policy and performance likely to be avoided; but the overall tendency is
clear; if the infant industry argum~nt has merit, the labor surplus economy
should increasingly be in a position to shift from traditional land-based
to non-traditiona l labor-based exports in its foreign trade and to a sub
stantial increase in the level of mutual interaction between agriculture and non-agriculture on the domestic front.
The changes in the general policy package required to accommodate
this change in the production and trading pattern are equally clear:
gradual liberalization of a number of markets previously controlled,
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directly or indirectly, by governrnent, rnainly on behalf of the new industrial
class.

Specificall y, we would expect foreign exchange controls to yield

to tariffs, and tariffs in turn to be gradually lowered, while the exchange
rate is initially devalued and then maintained at a more realistic level
(if necessary, by frequent quasi-routi nized, e.g., quarterly, adjustments );
simultaneou sly we would expect there to be less need for deficit financing
as both the government' s tax base and fiscal capacity and the system's
voluntary saving potential increase--h ence a reduction of inflationar y
pressures; finally, and most important from the point of view of this paper,
we would expect monetary refonn to take place, focussing on substantial ly
higher rates of interest and the consequent reduction of subsidies and the
role of credit rationing in investment decisions.
With the reduction of inflation and monetary reform yielding more
realistic real rates of interest, the differentia ls between official credit
markets and the unofficial or "parallel" markets are bound to diminish,
and the scope for an expanding network of financial intermediat ion likely
to increase substantial ly.

With domestic credit as well as foreign capital

now priced more realistical ly, the market can be expected to have a larger
(though still by no means exclusive) hand in determining allocations and
enterprise survival patterns.
All this, of course, depends on the existence of the proper dynamically
flexible institution al framework-- whether it is to lead or to accommodate
11
the increased desires of households and unincorpora ted businesses.

11

see Patrick's distinction in "Financial Development and Economic
Growth in Underdevelo ped Countries," op. cit.
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Government interventio n, in fact, shifts from the force-feedin g of desig
nated industriali sts, via the assignment of unearned profits, to the sub
sidization of a more and more varied and sophisticat ed institution al
constructio n program by the public sector.

Increasingl y as the real

economy becomes more export and efficiency- oriented, the brute act of
saving, fairly well served by intermediat ion through the family in agricul
ture and by the reinvestmen t of industrial profits in both rural and urban

/

industry gives way to the need for greater efficiency in the allocation
process.

This is tantamount to the increased need for a specialized

financial intermediat ion network serving the ever more demanding require
ments of differentia ted industrial activities.

To return to our homely

Robinson Crusoe analogy, interdepend ence in a competitive inter-islan d
market would sooner or later require him to seek out efficient investors
to match his saving effort.
If markets, especially foreign, are to be continuousl y expanded, the
system will require an equally expanding and increasingl y specialized
financial intermediat ion network.

Specialized banks, insurance and pension

funds, savings and loan institution s--finally even bond and stock markets-can be expected to increase in importance as the portfolio needs of savers
become more and more sophisticat ed and the distance between them and the
equally more sophisticat ed investors grows.

Thus, the relationshi p between

money, quasi-money and GNP and that between the assets of all financial in
stitutions and GNP, Goldsmith's financial intermediat ion ratio, are all likely
to rise in periods of rapid LDC growth, as the economy makes its way through
export substitutio n to economic maturity.

While Goldsmith is not sure about the

I..
I.
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direction of causality, he has found that the rate of growth of financial
intermediation is positively associated with the rate of growth in real
terms.

12

Japan's historically mild import substitution during the early Meiji
period gave way to an increased export orientation, accompanied by a larger
role for market forces, near the turn of the century.

While raw silk was

the main export crop initially, cotton textiles constituted 35% of her total
imports, and Japan did not become a net exporter of cotton yarn and cloth
until about 1900.

The policy shift from government ownership of major

industries and the favoring of large scale private industries via subsidies
and preferential interest rates took place during the same period.

Japanese

experience illustrates that, if the period of protection under mild import
substitution is used well, much of the infrastructure required for later
successful export substitution will have been laid and can continue to be
gradually expanded thereafter.

One example, of course, is in agriculture

where early public sector irrigation, research and education investments had
a substantial and sustained pay-off.

Another is in the area of the creation

of an appropriate financial infrastructure.

Postal savings were organized

early in the Meiji period, taking advantage of the well-understood (and
trusted) functions of an integrated national postal system.

Small savers

in large numbers (if not large amounts per capita) were attracted by this
form of intermediation which, along with the land tax, helped finance
government infrastructural expenditures.

12

Increasingly in the course of

see Raymond W. Goldsmith, £.E_• cit., p. 48.
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the 19th centu_ry, public and private commercial branch banking was estab
lished in rural areas,

13

savings banks spread, government bonds were issued

to households (instead of only to banks) and an increasingly diversified
banking system took shape.

Special banks were created for foreign trade, for

longer term investments in overheads, in industry and in the colonies.
Patrick has pointed out:

As

"between 1868 and 1914 Japan's financial system •••

developed rapidly into a modern, pervasiv~ variegated system, providing a
1114
wide spectrum of financial services.
The effective channelization of agricultural surpluses, aided by substan
tially positive real rates of interest (see Table 1), continued to be important
in Japan after the turn of the century.

The agricul-

tural sector remained a substantial net contributor to non-agricultur al
investment and, increasingly, industrial profits as well were committed to financial
intermediation , especially via banks, in place of the virtually exclusive
pattern of the reinvestment of industrial profits of the 19th century.

On

the other hand, we may note that securities markets and corporate bonds
played no major role until after World War II.
The successful overall performance of the Japanese economy during
this period is well known.

Agricultural labor productivity increased in

a sustained,if unspectacular,f ashion throughout the period, as did GNP
(see Table 1), keeping well ahead (low rates of) population growth.
13

sometimes in the form of "quasi-banks" which were multi-purpose
institutions growing out of trade and cash crop related credit advances.
14
H. Patrick, "Japan, 1868-1914," in Banking in the Early Stages of
Industrializati on, Rondo Cameron, ed., New York: Oxford University Press,
1967. This seems to be borne out in.current unpublished research by Goldsmith.
See also the high level of monetization (not including time deposits) reflected
in Column 1, Table 1.

Table 1
JAPAN

5-Year
Moving Average
Centered on

Real
GNP
M
Growth
GNP (current)
Rate
(1
2

1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
· 1932
1933
1934
1935

3.6
4.4
2.7
3.4
3.0
4.9
2.8
2.9
2.5
3.0
1.5
2.4
2,3
1.6
2.4
1. 8
1.0
2.1
2.5

Rate of
Non-Agricultural
Labor Absorption
(% change from
revious ear)
3

3.9
3.8
3.7
3,6
3.5
3.4
3.3
3.2
3.1
3.0
3.0
2.9 2.9
2.8
2,8
2.8
2.7
2.6
2.6
2.5
2.5
2.4
2.4
2.3
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.1
2.1
2.0
2.0
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7

.224
.230
.231
.238
.241
.240
.237
.235
.233
.227
.227
.227
.230
.226
.233
.245
.260
. 276
• 293

3.0
3.3
2.6
2.2
1.8
1.7
3.1
4.9
6,5
7.3
6.7
5.7
3,4
.7
2.2

.297

l.B

1.9

.291
• 287
.282
.282
.285
.291
• 290
.287
• 283
.275
.265
.262

.6
1.8
4,0
1. 6
2.4
2.4
2,6

1.8
1.8
1.8
1. 7
1.7
.4
.3

•8

Interest on Interest on
6-month time
Secured
Deposits (Avg) Loans (Avg)
from
revious ear) l'<'oininal Real Nominal Real
(6)
5
4
Inflation

(% price change

3,4

•8

5.1
5,9
6,3
6.7

1.8
2.2
2.7
2.9

.3
1.1
2.6
0

.5
0

.6
3.4
7.1
8,5
6.8
7,3
4.9
3,4
2.7
4,3
2.6
3.4
4.7
3.1
1.8
1.1
2.2
1.2
2.5
1.7
.3
.4
3.9
10.2
18.4
20.6
17.3
12.4
5.3
-1.1
-1.8
-1.0
-1.0
-1.6
-2.2
-4.5
-5.9
-5.3
-4.0
-3.2
-

•7

2.1
3.4

5,5
3.9
2.3
4.8
4.2
4.8
4. 5
1.5
-1. 9
-2.8
- .0
1
1.8
3,5
4.0
2.2
3.7
2.5

5.3
5.0
4.9
4.8
4.7
4.8
4.8
4.9
5.2
5.7
6.0
6.3
6.7
6.9
6.7
6.5
6.3
5.9
5,6
5.7
5.6
5.4
5.1
5.1
5.1
5.3
5.4
5.4
5.2
5.0
4,9
5.2
5.5
5.9
6.1
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.1
5,8
5.5
5.2
5.0
4.7
4.5
4.3

.9

2.6
3.8
4.3
2.9
3.9
2.
3,6
5.1
5.0
1.3
-5.2
-13,5
-15.4
-11.8
-6.5
•8

7.4
8.l
7.3
7.3
7.7
8.0
10.0
11.
10.3
5.7
7.7
5.0
2,0
.4

4,1

3.8

10.l
8,5
7.1
9.6
8.5
8.8
8.2
5.3
2.0
1.4
9.9
3.0
9.8
2.8
10.1
5,7
10.6
7.2
10.6
7.4
10.1
5.7
10.0
9.7
7.1
5.7
9.1
4.0
8.7
5,8
8.9
8.9
7.1
7.5
8.6
6.0
8.2
6.9
8.1
5,4
7.9
6.3
8.0
7.9
8.2
7.9
8.3
4.3
8.2
-2.3
7.9
7.7 -10.7
8.1 -12. 5
-8.7
8.6
9.0.
-3.4
4.2
9.5
9.8 · 10.9
ll.S
9,1
9.6
10.6
10,6
9.6
11.0
9.4
11.3
9.1
8.6
13.1
14.0
8.1
13.0
7.7
11.2
7.2
10.0
6.8
7.2
6.5
4.1
6.2
2.4
5.8
9.8
9.6
9.7
9.6
9.0
8.8
8.8
8.7
9.1

Gross
Saving
Rate
(% of GNP)
7
12.6
12.6
13.0
13.7
13.5
13,5
15.7
16.5
16.5
16.8
17.0
14.9
14.0
13.6
13.1
11.3
9.7
9.6
10.1
10.4
12.1
14.2
14.5
14.3
14.2
14,4
15.3
17.4
20.8
23.6
24.6
24.8
22,5
19.5
16.3
15.l
13,9
13.8

13.8
14,3
15.0
15.2
14.9
14,3

14.2
13.8
14.2
15.2
15.6

Notes:
(1)

=

M (cash currency and depo~it currency).
Cash currency= currency in circulation - cash holdings bv financial institutions
Deposit cu~rency = demand deposits of all banks - checks, etc. held by banks.
GNP (current):

(source: Historical
Statistics of Japanese Econom , Bank of Japan, 1962 [HSJE]).
at market prices in Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of Ja an Since 1868,
K. Ohkawa, et al, ed., Tokyo, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1974, Vol. 1 LTES

(2)

From LTES.

(3)

Refers to those employed less those engaged in agriculture and forestry.
of the Japanese Economy, Tokyo, Bank of Japan, 1966,)

(4)

Change in consumer prices from previous year (from LTES, op. cit., Vol. 8),

(5)

Tokyo banks:

from HSJE.

(6)

Tokyo banks:

through 1929:

(7)

Series disregards statistical discrepancies, from LTES.

"loans on deeds" from HSJE; from 193,0:

(From Hundred-Year Statistics

"loans onJ:1ills" from HSJE.

GNP (current) as in (1)
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Saving rates, initially modest, rose to more than 20% by World War I; the
sustained, if unspectacular, nature of this balanced export-oriented growth
path yielded rates of labor reallocation sufficiently rapid to culminate
in the end of the labor surplus condition by that time. 15
Turning to Taiwan, the case of a contemporary LDC moving
· along a more sharply delineated "ideal" path, we may note (see
Table 2) that typical, relatively low, real interest
rates in official markets-~along with a much higher informal market--were
adhered to during the import substitution sub-phase of the 1950 1 s, though
nominal rates were set higher than in most post-war LDC's in the effort to
curb the inflationary psychology.

At the same time productivity in agricul

ture increased consistently,while land reforms and infrastructural invest
ments combined to prepare the ground for fuller participation later on.
The shift from import to export substitution,accommodated by major
changes in the policy package,occurred in the early 1960's.

Stabilization and

a decline in the rate of inflation was followed by devaluation coupled with
import control liberalization and a substantial increase in the nominal
rate of interest.

As a consequence, the real rate of interest rose from

an average of 10% in 1958-1960 to close to 15% in 1963-65.

At the same

time the interest rate in the unofficial or''parallel" markets, deprived of
some of their monopoly content, declined from levels of 50% on average in the
late SO's to the vicinity of 25% per annum in the 60 1 s.

15

At least in agriculture. The controversy on the date of the "turning
point''need not detain us here. (See R. Minami, "The Turning Point in the
Japanese Economy," Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1968.)

Table 2
TAIWAN

3-Year
Moving Average
Centered on

GDP (current)
1

1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

.114
.121

.130
.157

Real
GDP
Growth
Rate
2

Rate of
Non-Agricu ltural
Labor Absorption
( % change from
revious ear)
3

8.5
T.'.O
6.8
6.2

4.1
2.1
0

7.5
5.0
4.0

.183
.200

7.1

.217
.241
.279
.310

6.9
6.9
8.1
9.7

3.4
3.4
3.4

11.1

3.3

10.8

2.2
4.7

.337
.364"
.391
.408
.420
.433
.473

.531

6.7

10.1

9.4
9.4
9.7
10.4
11.2

4.9

5.1
3.1
12.l

Inflation
(% price change
from
revious ear)
4

10.l
7.4
9.3
6.4
6.5
10.1
12.3
9.6
4.1
1.5

.o·

.6
1.8
3.9
4.9
5.0
3.7
3.7

Interest on
Deposits
(Average of
6 month and
1 year rates)
Nominal Real
(5

16.4
15.9
14.7
13.5
12.0
10.9
10.2
9.7
9.4
9.1
9.1
9.1
9.0
8.5

9. 9
5.8
2.4
3. 9
7 .9

9.4
9. 6

9.1
7 .6

5.2
4.2
4.1

5.3
4.8

Interest on
Secured
Loans
Nominal Real
6
26.9
24.6
23.l
22.4
21.0
20.3
18.9
18.0

16.8
17.2
13.8
16.0
14.5
10.2
6.6

16. 5

12.4
14.2
14.4

15.7
15. 0
15. 0
14. 7
14. 4

14.2
13. 6
12.9
12. 0

8.4

Gross
Savini=
Rate
(% of GI
7)

8.4

8.7
9.3
9,6
9,7
10.4
11. 5
12.7
14.l
16.2
18.4

14.4

20.l

12.9
10.5
9.3
8.6
9.2
8.3

21. 2

22.3
23.0
24.1
26.0

Notes:
(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)
(5)

line 34 (money) + line 35 (quasi-mon ey) + line 45 (time and savings deposits) in Internation al Financ
Statistics , various issues.
GDP (current): book value, at current prices from Taiwan Statistica l Data Book, 1973 [TSDS].
1972 GDP used in calculation s is preliminary estimate.
Same as for GDP (current) in (l); 1972 GDP used in calculation s i~ preljminary estimate.
Not 3-year moving average; is% change from previous year only,
For 1952-1966: refers to those employed (aged 12 and over) less those aged 12 and over engaged in agricul
For 1967-1972: refers to those employed (aged 15 and over) less those aged 15 and over engaged in agricul
forestry, and fisheries (since 1969, including servicemen ). ( From TSDS.)
% consumer price change in year from TSDS.
of
Average of (a) 6-month time deposits at banks (year-end interest rate per annum) (Source: The· Republic
China, Taiwan Financial Statistics Monthly, April 1975 [TFSM]).
(b) 1957-58: 1-year preferenti al time deposits from A.G. Chandarvar kar, IMF Staff Papers (197
18:83.

1959-1969:
1970-1972:

one year savings deposits in banks at year end (assumed compounding monthly
at the monthly interest rate for year end).
one year savings deposits in banks (year-end interest per year)[from TFSM].

(6)

Nominal rates; effective rates may be higher:
1953-55: secured time loans in banks at year P.nd (assumed compounding monthly at the monthly interest
rate for year end) from TFSM.
1956-69: same as for 1953-55, except "secured loans" instead of secured time loans.
1970-72: secured loans at banks (year-end interest rate per annum).

(7)

From TSDS.

GDP (current) as in (1).
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While elements of credit rationing,of course,persisted, such changes
in interest rate policy--even sharper in the case of South Korea where the
policy changes occurred a few years later--do imply a much enhanced role
forprivate saving via official intermediation channels and greater scope
for the use of government monetary policy.

As both Taiwan's and Korea's ex

perience in the 60 1 s showed, once saver confidence has been reestablished,
the relationship between interest and saving rates probably weakens, saving
becomes more closely tied to changes in the level of incom~ and interest
rates safely decline somewhat again,
At the same time (i.e., the 60's), the institutional structure of
financial intermediation became more diversified and sophisticated, and
household savers for the time had really viable alternatives to the unhappy
choice between direct investment and ~cceding to the government as a monop
sony borrower.

As a consequence, the gross saving rate for Taiwan, less

than 10% in 1954-58, rose to more than 20% by the endo6f the 60's.

Of this

remarkable total, 70% came from household saving, more than 80% of which,
in turn, made its way through financial channels.
During this period, the real performance of the economy picked up con
siderably.

Agricultural labor productivity spurted (from 2% to 4% plus);

the rate of labor reallocation, as indicated in Table 2, increased substan
tially; and the growth rate moved from 7% to approximately
10% annually.

While overall exports grew at rates in

excess of 30% annually by 1970--with more than 25% of the GDP exported-
what is even more interesting is the tremendous shift in composition from
traditional land-based to non-traditional labor-based commodities.

By 1970,

labor intensive industrial goods constituted more than 80% of total exports,
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in contrast to 25% in the early 1950's.

This major restructuring of

output and export patterns meant that, by the end of the 1960's, employ
ment in the industrial sector had increased at such a rate that, in spite
of still substantial (if declining) population growth, the sui,plus labor
conditions came to an end, as indicated by rapidly rising unskilled real
wages after that point.
A well-developed growing network of rural financial intermediation,
via cooperative banks, farmer associations and commercial branch banking
was, moreover, extremely helpful in ensuring that much of the industrial
sector growth followed an efficient low cost pattern, much of it directed
towards the expansion of rural industries, especially in food processing
and in subcontracting for larger, including export~oriented, fi1"llls.
a striking

It is

characteristic of the Taiwanese industrialization pattern that

it remained efficiently labor intensive through most of the 60's providing
employment to some of the poorest farmers; as a consequence, more than 50%
of farm family income was derived from non-agriculture by the end of the
1960's and the distribution of income in Taiwan remained one of the best in
the world during this period of rapid growth. 16
In the (milder) case of historical Japan as well as in the contemporary case of
Taiwan, we may thus note some approach to the idealized pattern described
earlier.

On the real side we encounter a gradual shift from land-intensive

16
The Gini level near .3 is remarkably low by LDC standards--mostly in
the .5 range. Even more interesting is that the initial rise anticipated
by Kuznets did not take place. This contrast, for income distribution,of a
secondary import substitution vs.export substitution choice is currently
under study but cannot be dealt with here. (See, however, J.C.H.Fei, G.
Ranis, and S. Kuo, "Growth and the Family Distribution of Income by Factor
Components: The Case of Taiwan," Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper
No. 223, March 1975 (revised April 1975).)
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exports fuelling import substitution, to labor-intensive exports, with
agriculture finally participating more fully via sustained productivity
increase, and labor being reallocated, until the economy's labor surplus condi
tion is ultimately exhausted and the transition to modern growth has been
successfully negotiated.

On the financial side, this requires the continued

growth of a more and more complex financial intermediation system accommodating-
and/or inducing--the generation and channelization of the agricultural sur
pluses, with organized money markets gradually reducing the importance
of parallel or dual markets, especially in rural areas, and providing fairer
access to all comers.

During this relatively market oriented export substitu

tion sub-phase, we can thus expect the economy not only to obtain a higher
level of efficiency but to be able to support a larger total effort, whether
measured in terms of labor reallocation, rates of saving,or growth.

III.

The "Non-Deviant" LDC in Transition

While the above export substitution path approaches some sort of
idealized sequence, it has, in fact, been followed by only a small minority
of so-called "deviant" LDC's.

Most contemporary developing economies can

be said to have more or less maintained their import substitution policy
syndrome after the inevitable end of their primary import substitution sub
phase of development.

As was pointed out earlier, the choice of secondary

import substitution at this point essentially means "more of the same"-except more so.

What is required basically

is continuity of the policies

previously in vogue--includin g with respect to financial institutions and
policies.

Specifically, in non-agr.iculture it means satisfying the ever
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increasi ng appetite , for capital and technolo gy, of the new capital goods,
durable consume r goods and processi ng industr ies--esp ecially, of course,
those in the hands of prime borrowe rs--and continui ng to accommodate to the
rising requirem ent$ for overhead s of the public sector; in agricul ture, it
essenti ally means maintena nce of the force feeding of subsidiz ed credit to
large farmers , with relative ly little attentio n to the effects on particip a
tion, on agricul tural product ivity, on default rates, or the generati on of
inter-se ctoral saving.
We, of course, recogniz e that these "choices " of growth paths, and of
accompa nying policy package s, are never quite as clear-cu t as all this in
real life, but tend to fade into each other at the edges.

But while there

certain ly ~xist substan tial element s of both seconda ry import substitu tion
and export substitu tion in the overall producti on and trade structur e of
most LDC's, the contras ts painted here are both meaning ful and instruct ive.
The performa nce of such''ty pical" countrie s as Brazil and the

Philippi nes is

sharply differen tiable from the deviant minority we were discussi ng in the
last section.
A labor surplus LDC which continue s to perseve re in traditio nal exports 
fuelled seconda ry import substitu tion long after its changing endowment
would seem to render it capable of beginnin g to shift to non-tra ditional
industr ial exports is likely to encount er ever increasi ng capital and tech
nology requirem ents along the way.

This means, in turn, that :the burdens

placed on the system's financia l institut ions, especia lly in te1'l!ls of the
quantity of saving which must somehow be generate d and channel ed, are sub
stantia lly increase d.

The capital requirem ents for process ing, durable
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consumer and most capital goods industries are generally substantial ly
larger than those applicable to non-durable consumer goods.
. ~.

Lumpiness is

more pronounced and public sector overhead and urbanizatio n costs likely
to increase.

With the financial intermediat ion network, on the other hand,

retaining, more or less, its import substitutio n characteris tics previously
described, the supply of domestic saving is not likely to increase pari passu.
In fact, the resulting continued state of "financial repression, " as Shaw
calls it, means that neither the increased participatio n of households and
of other medium and small savers nor the higher quality of allocation forced
by greater competitive -pressures is likely to occur as long as the official
policy of artificial low deposit and lending rates persists.

Instead, there

is an even greater likelihood of resort to inflationar y financing, public
and private, at home, plus even more fervent attempts to attract capital
from abroad, via special tax treatment and favored access to domestic loan
capital.

Consequentl y, both the choice of technology and of output mix

are likely to become more and more distorted in terms of a basic endowment
which can be expected to shift only gradually from its labor-abund ant/
capital-and -skill-shor t characteris tic •
.The accompanying relative neglect of food producing agriculture frequently
leads not only to non-support from that sector--eit her via the domestic saving
or foreign exchange route--but to the need to divert resources to the importa
tion of foods.

Ultimately, unless the outlook for the further expansion of

natural resources-b ased exports is good--and/o r foreign capital inflows make
up the difference-- customary rates of growth may not be long maintainabl e.
And even if they are, increasing problems of maldistribu tion and unemployment
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in the more and more capital-in tensive labor surplus economy are bound to
create more and more social and political stress and strain.

Thus, for

one reason or another-- and possibly both--eve n countries which have· been
navigatin g "successf ully'throu gh secondary import substitut ion waters,
i.e., at 6%-8% growth rates, may sooner or later find themselve s in
difficult ies.
The post-Worl d War II experienc e of the Philippin es (see Table 3) may be
viewed as represent ing one such case in point.

Primary import substitut ion which

started seriously after the War began to run out of steam by the end of
the 1950's.

Faced with a sharp decelerat ion in industria l growth and the

inability to depend on a sluggish primary export sector to provide the
necessary foreign exchange, the Government initially opted for devaluati on
and decontrol in the early 1960 1 s.

However, for a number of reasons, in

cluding the failure of food-prod ucing agricultu re to provide the necessary
support in the form of productiv ity and saving increases , and governmen t
unwilling ness to provide for real import liberaliz ation by tackling the
highly protectiv e tariff structure , this incomplet e venture into export
substitut ion proved unsuccess ful.

Largely as a conseque nce,decis ions,

especiall y after 1968, can be said to have taken the Philippin es firmly
down the secondary import substitut ion path.

Two decades of heavy protec-

tion have thus left the Philippin es with an increasin gly capital-i ntensive
geograph ically highly concentra ted industria l structure relying for its
continue d--if every more costly--g rowth on the expansion of tradition al
exports.

In spite of respectab le overall growth rates, in excess of 6%

in most years, not only social but even private rates of return in the

Table 3
PHILIPPINES

3-Year
Moving Averag e
Center ed on
A.

B.

1954
1955
1956
1957
J:958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
Notes:

M2
GDP ~curre nt)
1
.182

.186
.195
.198
.205
.207
.217
.234
.250
.253
.244
.241
.257
.282
.285
• 277
!265

Real
GDP
Growth
Rate
2
8.7
7.7
5.7
5.1
4.8
4.7
4.7
2.7
5.0
4.5
6.1
4.9
3.9
3.1
5.1
4.8

Rate of
Non-A gricult ural
Labor Absorp tion
(% change from
previo us ear)
3

1.5
-4.7
7.3
1. 2
8.0
3.5
7.6
6.2
-2.3
6.7
-7.0

Inflat ion
(% price change
from
reviou s ear)
4
-1.5
2.1
1.9
2.2
.3
2.1
3.0
4.4
5.7
7.7
6.3
5.2
4.7
3.6
8.5
16.3

Intere st on
Depos its
(Avera ge of
6 month and
l year rates)
Nomin al Real
5

5.8-6. 3

Intere st on
Secure d
Loans
Nomina l Real
6
(b)
( a)

1.1-1. 6

2. 4-2. 7
6 - 6.3
-2.2- -1.5
6.3-7.
6.5-7. 7 -9.8- -8.6
6.5-8. 0

7.8
8.0
8.0
8. 3
8.8
9.4
9.9
10.4
11.0
11.4

3.4
2.3
.3
21fJ

3.6
4.7
6.3
2.. 1
-5.3

Gross
Saving
Rate
(% of GDP
7
11.9
11. 8
12.6
13.1
13.7
13.4
15.1
16.9
19.2
20.1
20.3
20.2
20.0
21. 3
21.4
21.1
20.8

and saving s depos its) in Intern ationa l
line 34 (mone y)+ line 35 (quasi -mone y)+ line 45 (time
Financ ial Statis tics, variou s issues .
GDP (curre nt): at curren t prices .
No. 1 (SR)
For Sectio n A: Statis tical Report er (1969) , Vol. 13,
ts 1967-1 972 (Manil a: 1973) [NEDA].
Accoun
Income
al
Nation
The
.A.,
N.E.D
B:
n
Sectio
For
of 1955
(2) Same as for GDP (curre nt) in (1) for A: millio n,
for B: millio n j of 1967
year only
(3) Not 3-year moving averag e; is% change from previo us
force not engage d in agricu lture, forest ry,
labor
in
s
person
ed
employ
to
refers
"Non- agricu ltural"
huntin g and fishin g.
tical Handbook of the Philip pines (Burea u of the
1957-1 968: figure s are for Octobe r--from 1971 Statis
Census and Statis tics, Manila ).
BCS Survey of Househ olds Bullet in,
figure calcul ated from May 1968 to May 1969 from The
1969:
May, 1968, No. 25 and May 1969 No 27 ber to Decem ber).
1953-1 957: % consum er price change in Manlla {Decem
(4)
(Decem ber to Decem ber) from Statis tical Bullet in
1958-1 971: % consum er price change for Philip pines
s issues .
variou
;
pines)
(Centr al Bank of the Philip
From Philip pine Financ ial Statis tics (Centr al
( 5) Intere st on time deposi ts in comme rcial banks at vear end.
1973
e_r
Decemb
,
g in
Bank of the Philip pines)
tor year); effect ive rates may be higher . From Sharin
( 6) Nomin al rates for comme rcial banks (avera ge
a:
(Genev
ines
Phili
the
for
Growth
and
,
uit
E
Develo ment: A Programme of Emplo ent,
ILO, 1974.
(7) Same as for GDP (curre nt) in (1).

(1)

M:
2
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industrial sector have been declining.

Even more significant has been

the increase in underemployment and the worsening distribution of income.
The strikingly dualistic characteristic of Philippine development
extends as well to its financial institutions and markets.

A highly

organized official market catering mainly to the large-scale urban indus
trial sect-0r, on the one hand, and plantation-style export crops, on the
other, exists side by side with unorganized markets serving small industrial
enterprises (rural and urban) and food-producing agriculturalists.
annual rates of interest at

saving

Nominal

banks , governed by usury laws , remain

in the vicinity of 12%-14% (with effective rates somewhat higher) while
interest rates in the informal markets vary between 60 and 400 percent.

17

Interest rates offered to deposit0rs are also regulated and even more in
disequilibrium.

Within the official market, small savers can obtain no

more than 6%-8% nominal, but larger savers do have access to both commercial and
government deposit substitutes which earn substantially more.

In addition

to the disequilibrium low levels of both organized sector deposit and loan
rates, we may thus note the large legally induced "spread" creating what must be
regarded as a regulated banking oligopoly.

18

17

contrast this with an estimated real rate of return (before taxes)
on assets in manufacturing around 15% by the end of the 1960's leading to
an average nominal rate of return of between 20% and 25% minimum (see
Sharing in Development: A Programme of Employment, Equity and Growth for
the Philippines, G. Ranis, ed., Geneva: International Labour Office, 1974).
18
The argument by the banks that the present'spread"is necessary as
compensation for services rendered as financial intermediaries must be
judged to be largely spurious. Banks needing such a spread must be operating
highly inefficiently, and the economy would generally stand to benefit from
the elimination of same, which would result from the more competitive behaviour
of the group.

-24The growth of financial institutions, measured either by the
Goldsmith financial intermediation ratio or the (easier to obtain) rela
tionship between M , M and GNP, first accelerated and then (by the late
2
1
60's)reversed direction.

The banking system became more diversified and

non-bank financial institutions grew substantially, but most of the growth,
qualitative and quantitative, continued to affect the two enclave sectors.
An examination of the distribution of loans actually made by the official
banking system illustrates this further.

Between 1958 and 1967, for

instance, the smallest 20% of the loans absorbed less than 1% of the loans
made, while the largest 20% of the loans absorbed more than 90% of loan
19
.
.
d1at1on was directe d towar d s exten d.ing
va1ue. 1·ittle f"1nanc1al
interme
0

•

•

the capillary activities between these and agricultural plus small-scale
20
(including rural) non-agricultural activities.
The gross saving rate
rose steadily towards a peak of 21% in the late 60's but has declined more
or less consistently thereafter (19% in 1972).

Yet the increasingly capital

intensive and skill-intensive character of the industrialization process
has heightened capital requirements and lowered the (social and even the
,private) rate of return.

Increasingly, in its efforts to prolong the import

substitution regime, the Philippines has been forced to try to find new raw
material sources (e.g., bananas and now oil).

In the absence of a major

break-through by virtue of the bounty of nature, we can thus anticipate an in
creasingly costly industrial development pattern, with the terms of trade

19

Default rates, among farmers, in the Philippines were in the 50-75%
range in the mid-60's (see Gimenez, Mariano E., "Credit Delinquency,"
The Rural Banker, Vol. XIII, 9-10/1965, p. 47).
Contrast this with the 5% level for Taiwan (Shen, T. H., The Sino-American
Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction: Twent Years of Coo eration for
Agricultural Development Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970 , p. 205.
20
The fastest growth was recorded in investment houses, trust funds and
finance companies, less subject to fixed interest rate policies, but which
effectively exclude participation by potential small savers. The same thing
is true for such short-term papers as bankers' acceptances and Central Bank
certificates of indebtedness, a market which serves institutional investors
and wealthy families only.
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deteriorating further and, given the secularly stagnant food producing
agricultural sector, an increasing proportion of export proceeds having
to be diverted to the importation of food.

Moreover, given the inherently

labor surplus condition of much of the Philippines, continuation along the
present narrow growth path would, even in the advent of a new natural
resources bonanza, be politically difficult to maintain in terms of the
negative employment and distributional outcomes which can be expected.
The post-War experience of Brazil (see Table 4) may be viewed as repre
senting another historical illustration of the path most LDC's have, in fact,
chosen.

After transiting from primary to secondary import substitution in

the 50 1 s, Brazil by the early 60 1 s was experiencing all the previously stated
symptoms of increased industrial inefficiency accompanied by increased financial
"repression."

On the real side we may note increasing industrial capital

output ratios and stagnant, if high, saving rates--with the contribution of
households, given severe inflation, minimal.

Financial intermediation remained

relatively stagnant, with Goldsmith's financial intermediation l"atio falling
from 70% in 1948 to 55% in 1963. 21
By the early 60's (see Table 4), even the rate of growth, fuelled by
th, reinvestment of industrial profits, the effects of public sector deficit
finance and increasingly reluctant foreign investors, was becoming somewhat
anemic.

By the .1·1~.d-1960' s corporate self-finance amounted to more than 8%

of GNP.

Brazil's balance of payments problems had begun to mount and her

im.lation seemed out of control.

21

rn fact, Goldsmith found that less than 3% of gross national saving
was channeled through these intermediaries. For a relevant discussion of
the Brazilian case, see Andre F. Montoro, "Some Aspects of the Recent
Development of the Brazilian Financial System," Dissertation Draft, Yale
University, 1975.

Table 4
BRAZIL

3-Year
Moving Average
Centered on
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

M2
GDP (current)

Real
GDP
Growth

m

Rate
(2)

. 282
.271
.255
.250

8.4
5.7
3.2

.238
,240
.239
.255
.264
.275
. 301

2.4

3.6
4.2
6.4
7.7
9.3

9.9
10.4

Inflation
( % price change
from
Erevious iear)
( 3)
43.2

23.9

60.1
74.8
69.2
54.9
32.6
29.6
23.5

21.6
19.6
18.6

Finance
Company
Interest Rate
for Borrower
Nominal Real
(4)
28.6
35.1
37.8
37.8
34.9

•e:'j

Finance
Company
Bill of Exchange
Yield
Real
Nominal
(5)

-19.3
-31. 5
-39.6

-31.4
-17.l
2.3

34.3
33.9
33.1

11. 5

31.0
28.4

11.4
9.8

4.7
10.4

72.8
65,3
57.·o
55.l
53.8
52~4

40.2
35.7
33.5

Gross Saving
Rate
(% of GDP)
(6)
19.9
21. 0
22.2
21. l
20.3
21.8
23.2

33.5
34.2
33.8

Notes:
(1)

( 2)
( 3)
( if.)

M2:

3:

line 34 (money)+ l~ne
(qu~~i-mo~e~~ :n(ti~~n=~d :a:!~g; d;~~:i1~t=~n:~f ~~ly;~~~~cial
3
5
0
0
Fig~e
:or
1965.savi~gs
eposTi_s
savi~gs deposits from Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil
Statistics, various issues.
1menond
a
(January 1974), Vol. 10, No. 1.
N
[CE]
GDP (current): at current prices from Conjuntura Economica ( 1973), Vol. 27 , o. 12 _ •
1969-1972 GDP's are preliminary estimates.
From CE 1969-1972 GDP's are preliminary estimates.
h
) f
CE
·
Refers_,to General Price
InciE=_x ( Aggregat e s upp 1Y)--(December
c ange
rom
,
___
.to_ December
..
To -I966 from NESS

•1967-70: (Rio de Janeiro) 180-day loans for working capital compounded monthly at the average December monthly
interest rate from Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil (1974), Vol. 10. No. 9 [BOLETIM] •
l~~l-V2: (Rio de Janeiro) 360-day loans for consumer credit compounded monthly at the average December monthly
-·
interest rate from Boletim.
- --1967-70: (Rio de Janeiro) 180-days maturity; compounded monthly at the average December monthly interest
rate from [BOLETIM].
l ·
.. ___ ,- ~ _.l,~71-72: (Rio de _,1-~neiro) _?_6.Q:-_<g1ys maturity (y~ar-end % interest rate__ per annum) from Bo eti~.
(5) To 1966: refers to 6-month exchange bills from W. L. Ness in Economic Development and Cultural Change
~
(1974)~ Vol. 22, No, 9 [NESS]
( 6) Flow of funds savings--estimate from NESS.

-26-

In the post-1964 period a new (military) government initiated a series
of reforms, including devaluation o~ the exchange rate and partial abrogation
of the anti-usury laws, which permitted a modest increase in the nominal
rate of interest along with other components of a so-called export substitu
tion or liberalization oriented policy package.

At the same time, both the

relative size and degree of diversification of the financial intermediation
network increased significantly, accompanied by a narrowing of the interest
rate spread between official and unofficial markets, on the one hand, and
between lending and borrowing rates, on the other.

Real interest rates

gradually became substantially positive for the first time (see Table 4) as
inflation declined from 70% levels to around 20% and nominal rates of interest
rose as high as 50% for the case of finance company instruments. 22

Saving

and loan associations and other specialized intermediaries assumed real impor
tance for the first time--as witnessed by the fact that commercial banks were
responsible for 94% of all loans to private borrowers in 1964, but for only
61% of a much larger total by 1972.

Government bonds, previously sold almost

exclusively to the banking system, now began to attract private customers-
especially after the so-called monetary correction was introduced in 1968. 23
Both the M2/GDP ratio and the saving rate reversed trend as a result of the
reforms.

What followed was a marked improvement in growth performance and,

though we lack annual data,

the rate of surplus labor absorbed in non-

22 B
.
.
y using
t he d evice
of 1 etters o f exch ange whose 1 egal return was
fixed but which could sell at a substantial discount.
23 Th.
.
. dexation
.
. h many
is permits
t h e in
o f government b on d s a 1ong wit
other monetary instruments. The overall role of indexation is a most in
teresting but large subject and cannot really be dealt with in the context
of this paper.
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agricultural activities undoubtedly increased.

Much of this additional

labor absorption was reflected in such labor-intensive areas as footwear
and related to a substantial export boom in recent years.
Nevertheless, as in the case of the Philippines in the early 60's,
it is not at all clear whether Brazil has really determined to gradually
shift to an export substitution type of growth path, whether she is back
sliding or simply experiencing random oscillations in policy.

Certainly,

the experience of the most recent past provides room for doubt.

Perhaps

most important is the fact that the level of effective protection of Brazilian
industry has undoubtedly again increased substantially,that more than 60% of
the spectacular increase in exports in the early 70's was in primary products,
and that an increasing proportion of her industrial exports was in the durable
consumer and processed goods area and heavily subsidized. 24

Certainly Brazil's

current emphasis on high technology and capital intensive industries, e.g.,
in petro-chemicals, atomic energy, etc., in the presence of a still very
substantial overhang of surplus labor,seems to argue in favor of the inter
pretation that the center of gravity may be shifting back towards a policy
of secondary import substitution--if somewhat milder than in many other
direct-controls-orient ed LDC's.

Growth rates are beginning to decline again;

but, perhaps more significant is Brazil's unfavorable, and apparently worsening,
•
d"istri.b ution
•
d 25
income
recor.

24

such subsidies are provided by the government in terms of differential
interest charges, tax exemptions, rebates, etc. Moreover, multinationals are
asked to export below cost in return for continuing to enjoy guaranteed high
profits in the domestic market. Such "pushing out" of industrial exports
may be termed "export promotion" to distinguish it from the more organic
dynamic resource endowment-sensitive process of "export substitution."
25
see Al Fishlow, "Brazilian Size Distribution of Income," American
Economic Review, May 1972.
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IV.

Summary.a nd Conclusio ns

As we have tried to show in an admittedl y somewhat heuristic fashion,
the appropria te developm ental role of financial institutio ns and policies
cannot be satisfact orily assessed independe nt of time and place.

Instead,

for the typical labor surplus economy, we have tried to different iate among
the functions to be performed in each phase of the transitio n process.

This,

in turn, has permitted us, with the help of some real world illustrat ions,
to different iate between an idealized or "deviant" and a more realistic
or "non-dev iant" pattern in the actual evolution of financial institutio ns
and policies in the contempor ary developin g world.
The contrasts between these two sets are substanti al and instructi ve.
The deviant LDC utilizes its primary import substitut ion sub-phase not only
to protect its fledgling entrepren eurs but also to construct the financial
and physical infrastru cture required subseque ntly, pays due attention to
agricultu ral productiv ity increase, and transits before long into export
substitut ion.

It requires the help of a policy reform package and a finan

cial intermed iation structure flexihle with respect to the changing tastes
for real and financial assets as well as changing investor competenc e.
The non-devia nt LDC elects to move from primary to secondary import sub
stitution , a move which implies an increasin gly capital and skill intensive
growth path and pressure for a continuat ion and, in fact, intensifi cation
of the existing policy package.

This includes the relative neglect of agri

culture and, with low participa tion by household s and relativel y narrow
official intermedi ation markets, heavy reliance on public, corporate and
foreign saving in satisfyin g rapidly growing industria l capital requireme nts.
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Both sets of countries may show relatively good growth performance,
but the first as a consequence of a gradual shift to fuller human resources
utilization, the second via enhanced reliance on the natural resources base
and/or foreigners.

Pronounced difft~rences are likely to appear even for

those blessed with really abundant natural resources, i.e., in the income
distribution and unemployment dimensions of development; and certainly for
those not quite so lucky there arise questions as to the longer term prospects
of maintaining a satisfactory rate of growth itself--at least without incurring
a prohibitively high structure of foreign debt.
If all but the really exceptional cases (e.g., the oil countries) are
thus likely to run into increasing difficulties--a s they, in fact, have-
why, it may well be asked, does the majority of LDC's not shift their
policies towards export substitution and away from secondary import sub~
. ?26
.
st1tut1on.

A large part of the answer is, we believe, that it is politic-

ally difficult to do so.

The changes contemplated threaten not only the

unearned profits of the new industrial elite but also the controls-relate d power
(and incomes) of the bureaucracy.

Small wonder that policy-makers-- who are

presumably just as human as the rest of us--would prefer to avoid taking the
unpleasant medicine of devaluation,cre dit and import liberalization if it can
be avoided.

The actual (or putative) availability of a friendly Mother Nature-

and/or foreign donors--is

ideally suited to strengthening the natural

temptation to leave things more or less as they are.

26

Policy makers in our

It could, of course, be because the reasoning underlying this paper
is seriously deficient; but this possibility is arbitrarily excluded.
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"deviant" minority group of LDC's, it should be noted, are not necessarily
smarter or more virtuous, but rather more "up against it," without recourse
to the same pleasant alternatives. Thus while, in theory, additional
resources--whether via the bounty of nature or foreign lenders--should be
all to the good, i.e. , provide an additional potential advantage to a
country contemplating a painful transition from one sub-phase to another,
it may, in fact, not work that way in the realm of political economy.
This is, in fact, akin to a generalized version of the so-called "Kuwait Effect"
on a country's exchange rate and balance of payments.
All this, of course, does not imply, that the majority of contemporary
LDC's do not consider exports--especially industrial exports--hi.ghly desirable
and are willing to go to some lengths to achieve a better perfor~ance in
this regard.

Even such strong proponents of import substitution strategies

as Prebish have substantially moderated their views in recent years.

But

the difference is that the exports being generated by and large result from
policies which "push out" exports artificially without a basic change in the
import substitution environment.

Notice, for example, that a substantial

portion of the industrial exports of such countries as Brazil and Mexico in
recent years has not been in the field of relatively labor intensive non
durables but in such capital and skill intensive areas as durable consumer
goods.

This attempt at an export orientation--which may be called "export

promotion"--is thus not to be confused with "export substitution" caused by the
gradually

evolving play of comparative advantage,as liberalization replaces

infant industry protection--but is rather the result of policies intended
to subsidize industrial exports while maintaining the hot-house temperatures
of import substitution.
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Institutional devices are often created to help promote exports,
e.g. , the use of interest rate differentials and"special windows".

Fiscal

incentives are given and, finally, companies, including the multi-nationals,
are pressured directly to export a certain portion of their output, even if
below cost, in exchange for the guarantee of the maintenance of high unearned
profits on the rest of their output in the protected domestic market.

Thus

the increased value of industrial exports by itself does not necessarily signal
a switch to a more endowment sensitive growth path; nor does the establish
ment of additional specialized financial facilities to encourage industrial
exports.

An examination of value added at international prices will indicate

that "crimes" committed in the name of export promotion can be just as
costly as those committed in the name of the no longer as fashionable import
substitution.

As long as the golden goose of natural resources abundance

doesn't give out--and/or the political problems attending a worsening dis
tributional outcome can be handled--negative value added on both fronts can
be "afforded."

In any case, without the--often admittedly painful--changes

in policy described earlier, the transition to a more efficient, broadly
participatory growth path cannot be effected.
What is required, in short, is an uncommonly high degree of statesman
ship.

Mobilizing the rural sector early and in a sustained and persistent

fashion; building the financial infrastructure required for the effective
channelization of the resulting surpluses; and, finally, permitting the
industrial sector to help finance its own future growth via export substitu
tion all imply government actions challenging old habits and deeply entrenched
interests.

Small wonder that the greater the opportunity provided by natural

resources or foreign capital

the greater the temptation to use it instead

to help postpone the day of reckoning.

-32-

Navigating towards economic maturity via some approximation to the
idealized path sketched here--both real and financial--thus requires both
technical competence and the political will to secure the necessary agreement
among the various parties to the social contract.

That some groups, e.g.,

small farmers, medium-scale entrepreneurs, and other economically disen
franchised elements would be likely to benefit from the proposed change of
strategy is clear enough.

But the fact that even the landlords and large

scale industrialist class stands to benefit, over the longer term, from a
more rational interest rate policy, for instance, is less obvious.

Such a

change in the environment will call for a change in the way profits, or
rents, are earned but not necessarily in the volume or even in the relative
shares.

A shift from monopoly to earned profits is likely to mobilize

substantial underutilized entrepreneurial,managerial and innovative
resources for the first time and thus lift the entire performance of the system
onto new tracks.

The alternative may well be that, in spite of all efforts

to prop up declining rates of return, dwindling domestic markets and the
increasingly difficult process of fuelling import substitution while pulling
along a recalcitrant agricultural sector, will eventually boomerang for
the ver;_r urban industrial class it is intended to protect.
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